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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
A UNITED NATIONS TASK
B. DE SCHUTTER*
Let us give the world cause to say: These were dedicated

men. They did not pose and postpone but strove humbly
and honestly to lighten the afflictions that weigh so heavily
on mankind.
Ed. Hambro,

25th Anniversary of
the United Nations,
October 14, 1970.
The Congo: November, 1964. Rebels under the leadership
of Gbenye made massive arrests of foreigners, particularly Belgians
and Americans. The captives included women and children. The
rebels considered them hostages; they were humiliated, deprived
of decent living conditions and faced the threat of immediate execution.' By November 24 all peaceful means of freeing the captives had been exhausted without success. 2 With the agreement
of the official Congolese government and the logistic support of
the United States and the United Kingdom, Belgian paratroopers
executed a three-day rescue operation in Stanleyville and Paulis.a
Approximately 1600 were evacuated. Official notice of the oper* Director, Center for International Criminal Law, University of Brussels
Law School.
The Editorial Board acknowledges certain deficiencies in the footnotes accompanying this article but due to publication deadlines and inaccessibility of
materials, complete citations were impossible. The information contained in the
footnotes, however, is sufficient to indicate the location of authorities cited.
Quotations originally appearing in French have been translated by A.F. Menke,
Editorial Board member.
1. Conference held by Baron P. Nothomb, former consul of Belgium in
Stanleyville, at the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations, Dec. 27,
1964. Text in 18 CHRON. POL. Tp. 488 (1965).
2. Declaration of Belgian Foreign Minister P. H. Spaak before the U.N.
Security Council, Dec. 11, 1964, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1173 at 2-22 (1964). The
Belgian authorities contacted the U.N., the OAU, the ICRC, African heads of
governments and even the head of the rebels, Gbenye. The Congolese government mentioned its approval in a letter from Prime Minister Tsjembe to
U Thant, dated Nov. 24, 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6060 (1964).
3. The United Kingdom gave permission to use the logistic facilities on
the island of Ascencion, while the United States provided the planes necessary
for the transportation of men and material.
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ation was given to the United Nations Security Council on the day
it was begun. 4 It was not until December that the question was
taken up by the Security Council on the request of 22 member
nations' and the Congolese government itself. 6
Nigeria: 1964. Starvation, lack of medical care and every
variety of human suffering were rampant as the Biafran secession
struggle raged. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), willing and able to provide assistance, was thwarted by
the persistent refusal of Lagos and the Biafran authorities to accept
deliveries of food and medicine. Unprotected relief flights were
easy prey for air and ground fire, so the air lift was halted for several weeks because it was simply too dangerous to continue. It is
still impossible to estimate how many innocent lives were lost. 7
East Pakistan: 1970. A cataclysmic natural disaster took
the lives of half a million people; the extent of material losses remains unknown. The characteristic difficulties of organizing a
coordinated relief action were compounded by the friction of Indo-Pakistanese relations and the internal tensions of East Pakistan
itself. Millions suffered while the question of an air lift from Central Pakistan over Indian territory went unanswered. 8 The anticipatory drama was even more intense at the end of 1971 when the
chaos in East Pakistan resulted in the creation of an independent
Bangla Desh and the exodus of homeless millions. Local authorities forced a halt to the activities of the United Nation East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO), a move which benefitted no one
but caused only greater suffering. 9
The pattern is apparent: in each of these human crises people were in dire need of humanitarian aid, and in each a sovereign
was able to prevent or at least severely limit the availability of assistance. Among the reasons for these failures are the inability to
act immediately and to conserve that time which is being measured
4. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doe. S/6063 (1964); Letter from the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964).
5. U.N. Doc. S/6076 (1964); U.N. Doc. S/6076/Adds. 1-5 (1964).
6. U.N. Doc. S/6096 (1964).
7. See De Standaard, Sept. 25, 1969, at 7 in which mention was made of a
million and a half dead and a thousand victims per day.
8. U.N. Doc. E/4994 (1970); see U.N. Press Release, G.A. Res. 4400,
at 141 (1970).
9. See Gottlieb, The United Nations and Emergency Humanitarian Assistance in India-Pakistan,66 AM. J. INT'L L. 362 (1972).
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in human suffering, and the lack of energy of the organizations
from which one should expect determination and action.
The U.N. Security Council did not condemn Belgium, the
United States or the United Kingdom. While it might be argued
that the thesis of humanitarian intervention was thereby endorsed, 10 there was certainly no sign of unanimous approval of
the operation." It is important to note, in this respect, that much
of subsequent valid criticism of certain military aspects of the intervention would have been avoided had the action been conducted
under some international or by an international organization itself.
The need for U.N. support was even more urgent in the Biafran
affair where the absence of support by an international organ rendered the spontaneous offers of assistance largely ineffectual. The
U.N. concealed itself behind the internal affairs of a member state
clause, 12 professing belief in the competence of a regional instrument, the Organization for African Unity."3
The Pakistan and Bangla Desh issues were the subject of
dramatic but fruitless sessions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.' 4 While debate insufferably followed debate,
UNEPRO was forced to abandon its humanitarian efforts for lack
of the support necessary to force the receiving state's cooperation.
Once more the governments in conflict retained the ultimate power
to decide whether innocent human beings would live or die, a matter which should be the province of the collective conscience of
mankind.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In the exercise of its fundamental rights a sovereign state en10. The Resolution of the Security Council of Dec. 30, 1964, [U.N. Doc.
S/6129 (1965)] is limited to recalling the principle of non-intervention in
internal affairs of nations and requesting the Organization for African Unity to
do all it can to bring about national reconciliation.
11. Several countries, i.e. Ghana, Mali, Burundi, Soviet Union, clearly
condemned the intervention as being non-humanitarian in nature. They did not,
however, oppose the legality, as such, of humanitarian interventions.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
13. Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the
Work of the Organization, June 16, 1968, to June 15, 1969, 24 U.N. GAOR
Supp. IA; U.N. Doc. A/7601/Add.1 at 205 (1969); Press Conference of Secretary-General U Thant, Jan. 4, 1970, in Dakar, Senegal, 7 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE 34 (No. 2, 1970), Press Conference of Secretary-General U Thant,

id.at 38.
14. This was emphasized in a speech made by Pakistanese Foreign Minister A. Bhutto before the Security Council on December 15, 1971. U.N. Doc.
S/PV. 1614/Add.1 (1971).
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counters a number of limitations which may be, and typically are,
the consequences of freely accepted obligations or of enforced restrictions. They also result from certain transcendant norms,
which concern the state's subjects directly and constitute a supreme
law based on universal morality and the human conscience. 15 Any
violation of this imperative common law of mankind is a direct
crime against humanity.'" Each breach should provoke a human
solidarity aimed at the protection of fundamental human rights
through the most -universal mechanisms possible while avoiding
the intervention of domestic mechanisms.
A humanitarian intervention is an act performed for the purpose of forcing a sovereign to respect fundamental human rights
in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives. 7 It is an attempt
to compel a state to act or to refrain from acting, and may eventually be backed up by the use of force.' 8 If the premise is accepted that sovereignty may be curtailed in the case of abuse of its
prerogatives, then it is necessary to formulate certain minimum
conditions under which such a limitation is permissible and to establish a precise procedure to insure strict respect of these conditions. Any action to restore legality must itself be founded in
legality, and any intervention in the domestic realm of a state, even
if lawfully undertaken, must be executed with the greatest caution.
II.

THE PERMISSIBLE CHARACTER OF A HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION
The concept of humanitarian intervention seems to have its
genesis in the evolution of the modem Turkish state during the
19th Century. On behalf of humanity and in defense of moral
dignity the barbaric religious persecution of Christians was ended
through a joint action decided by England, France and Russia and
15.

Aroneanu, La guerre internationale d'intervention pour cause d'hu-

manitg, 19 REv. INT. D.

PLN.

173 (1948).

16. Rougier, La thgorie de rintervention d'humanitg, 17 GEN. D. INT'L
PUBL. 468, 471 (1910); Stowell, La Theorie et la practique de l'intervention,
40 REc. CoURs ACAD. D. INT. 91, 138 (No. 2, 1932).
17. VAN BOGAERT, BEGINSELEN VAN HET VOLKENRECHT (PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw) 73 (1958); Aroneanu, supra note 15 at 176; Rougier,
supra note 16, at 472; Stowell, supra note 16, at 92; L. CAVERn, LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PosmFF 631 (3d ed. 1969); Fawcett, Intervention in
InternationalLaw, 103 REC. CouRs ACAD. D. INT'L 343 (No. 2, 1961).
18. Potter, L'intervention en droit international moderne, 32 REC. COURS
AcAD. INT'L 607, 623 (No. 2, 1930).
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set forth in the Treaty of London of July 6, 1827.1' A more
identifiable intervention for humanitarian motives was the French
military mission to Syria in 1860 which, in combination with diplomatic pressure exerted by some of the major powers, forced the
Turkish sovereign to reorganize the internal structure of the Empire. This undoubtedly was an infringement of the domestic affairs principle.
The Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878 confirmed the right of
intervention to protect the residents of the European parts of the
Turkish Empire and guaranteed adherence to a set of minimum
standards, including religious freedom.20 These provisions were
invoked in the case of the so-called Armenian massacre in 1896.21
Other 19th Century interventions were undertaken on behalf of the
people of Macedonia,2 2 and the political prisoners in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,2" as well as in Bulgaria and BosniaHerzegovina 24 and by the United States in support of the Cuban
uprising against Spain.25 One might also cite the intervention on
behalf of the Israelites in Romania and Russia and the diplomatic
note of the Protecting European Powers to the Sultan of Morocco
imposing the duty
to abolish torture in his empire, that is, corporal punishment
subjecting the victim to mutilation or slow death and to ob26
serve in the future the laws of humanity [italics added].
In the 19th and early 20th centuries several interventions
were initiated which sought, although not exclusively, to assure
the humanitarian character of the exercise of sovereign power.
But since World War I the Congo case is the isolated example,
although Aroneanu considers World War IIthe "first international
humanitarian intervention war."'27 It remains an open question,
19. Rougier, supra note 16, at 473.
20. Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia,
and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, signed at Berlin, July 13,
1878. 2 AM. J.INT'LL. 401 (Supp. 1908).
21. CHARMITANT, TABLEAU OFFICIEL DES MASSACRES D'ARMENIE,
(1896); MANSTAM, LE SORT DE L'EMPiRE OITOMAN 187 (1917).

114

22. Rougier, L'intervention de l'Europe dans la question de Macedonie,
13 REV. GEN.D. INT'L PUBL. 178 (1906).
23. VAN BOGAERT,supra note 17, at 73.
24. Rolin-Jacquemyns, 8 REv. D. INT'L ET LEG. COMP. 675 (1876).
25. de Lapradelle, Chronique sur les affairs de Cuba, 1 REV. D. PUBL. ET
SC. POL. EN FRANCE ETA L'ETRANGER 74 (1900).
26. Rougier, La question de l'abolition des supplices et l'intervention
europeene, 17 REv. GEN.D. INT'L PUBL. 98 (1910).
27. Aroneanu, supra note 15, at 200.
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then, whether practice proves that humanitarian intervention has
a valid basis in customary international law.28
The principles of equal sovereignty of all states and the correlative duty of nonintervention in domestic affairs are, of course,
cornerstones of international relations. The rights to independence
and freedom from intervention are basics of the law of nations and
29
are among the first to be included in important declarations.
Those who advocate absolute nonintervention leave rebellion, internal strife and uprisings to the exclusive competence of the sovereign, which is solely responsible for law and order within its
territory. 0 Strong arguments may be made in support of this
view, among them the danger of subverting the humanitarian character of an intervention in order to obtain, or justify, an influential
position within the political, economic or military domain of the
receiving country. Such a possibility instills in small countries a
realistic fear for their security and independence. Further, the
value of any humanitarian mechanism which might actually lead to
more suffering and a greater number of victims is questionable.
On the other hand, serious doubts exist concerning any theory of total sovereignty unlimited by certain obligatory standards
which, even if not elements of substantive international law,
surely form part of a transnational universal morality. Does it
serve justice to allow a sovereign the benefit of an unrestricted
right to independence when it uses that very right to perform acts
which conflict with generally accepted principles of humanity and
constitute crimes against mankind?
Abuse of a generally recognized right can lead to its suppression and the removal of a state's immunity."' Reason and justice
dictate that the behavior of individuals who act on behalf of and
with the authority of a sovereign state should be subject to higher
rules than those which govern individuals not bearing such responsibilities. Reason and justice equally impose a duty upon
28. Winfield, The Grounds of Intervention in International Law, 5

Y.B.

INT'L L. 149, 162 (1924); Potter, supra note
TRArrI DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC 307 (1921).

18, at 653;

BRIT.

FANCHILLE,

29. See The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 99 (No. 10, 1970).

30. E. STOWELL,
31. See 1 HYDE,

INTERVENTION 58 (1921).
INTERNATIONAL LAW 118

U.N. Doc.

A/RES/2625,

(1945); Potter, supra note 18,

at 648; Stowell, supra note 16, at 95.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol3/iss1/12

6

De Shutter: Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

other states to remove the veil of domestic jurisdiction when necessary for the protection of individuals, whether nationals or aliens,
whose fundamental human rights are denied. When a sovereign
proves itself unable or unwilling to properly exercise its police
power or other prerogatives which attach to its status, the community of states itself must intervene to end this detournament de
souverainete8 2 and restore human rights. The right to intervene
is not limited to a prejudiced state, but is rather the duty of the
community of mankind, an actio popularis.33
"The one whose liberty to do wrong has been abolished is one
fortunately vanquished," wrote Thomas Aquinas. 3 4 While these
arguments have convinced several authors of the legality of humanitarian intervention, 35 the inherent conflict of the sovereignty
principle with the concept of permissible intervention necessitates
precise delineation of the circumstances and conditions under
which interference with sovereign rights is justifiable and feasible.
III.

CONDITIONS ESTABLISHING THE PERMISSIBLE CHARACTER
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Given the delicacy required when dealing with the concept
of intervention, and the dangers of generalization, it seems wisest
to discuss only strict humanitarian intervention; 83 that is, in case
of maltreatment of individuals in peace or in war, through repeated or permanent attitudes, acts or omissions, which constitute
a negation of the human rights recognized by all civilized nations
as the fundamentals of human dignity: the rights to life, food and
medical care, for example.
A.

Breach of Customary Minimum Rules

Any limitation of the rule of sovereign independence is acceptable only if clear subordination to a higher legal principle can
32. Rougier, supra note 16, at 495.
33. 1 HYDE, supra note 31, at 21-22; Stowell, supra note 16, at 148.
34. Epitre 5, Ad. Marcellinum.
35. E.g., L. CAvAR,, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PosrrIFF 632 (3rd
ed. 1969); GROTIUS, De iure belli ac pacis, Bk. II, chp. XX, XL; 1 OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (8th ed., Lauterpacht 1958); WODSE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 19 (1860); Graham, Humanitarian Intervention, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 327
(1924).
36. Such intervention would include, but is not limited to cases of persecution based on political grounds, oppression of minorities, or lack of objective justice.
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be proven. Such higher principles are those of humanitarian law
as expressed in certain widely accepted conventions. It is not
necessary that a state have expressed its willingness to consider
itself bound because their universal compulsory character leaves
no doubt that all of these traitgslois codify customary minimum
rules known to all sovereigns. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 7 the Two Covenants,3 8 the 1949 Geneva Conventions39 and the Genocide Convention4 ° sufficiently state the duties
of any sovereign and the rights of any individual. Further definition is probably forthcoming. The Conference of Government
Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts has prepared
two draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, which will probably be submitted to a diplomatic conference early in 1974. 4 ' The fact that over 75 nations took part in
the Conference, together with a number of international governmental and non-governmental institutions, is indicative of the
global concern over humanitarian rules in the light of recent experience.42
Any intervention must be based upon specific and recognized
legal norms to be invoked by the intervening authority. Such
norms are found in the conventions; it is neither necessary nor
sufficient that a rule of domestic legislation be violated. The
37. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
38. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
39. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, [19551
3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.
40. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
41. International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, May 3-June 3, 1972) 2
vols. (1972); see specifically id., Questionnaire Concerning Measures Intended
to Reinforce the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949-Replies Sent by Governments.
42. ld.
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breach must be of a certain qualitative and quantitative gravity.4"
Whether the breach is committed by the state itself, or merely
ordered or approved by it, the state's responsibility for a violation
of a customary humanitarian rule must be proven. 4 4 Passivity in
the case of a violation by an individual may equally bring about
state responsibility where knowledge can be demonstrated.
B.

Procedural Prerequisites

Whenever the use of intervening force is threatened the prospect of abuse is real unless it is foreclosed by reliable safeguards.
To minimize this risk, a precise procedure must be established
and rigidly adhered to. It would consist of several distinct, formal
steps:
1. Filing of a complaint, setting forth the alleged facts and
the humanitarian law relied -upon. This avoids inconsiderate action, which can be the starting point of self-interested attempts to
influence the domestic affairs of a state. Even where the proposed
action is based upon well known facts established by accepted and
objective bodies or techniques (for example the ICRC or U.N.
observers), the requirement of a complaint is an indispensable
protective device.
2. Publication of the complaint and the specifics of the
contemplated intervention, not only to the state accused but also
to the other members of the international community. Notice to
the accused state is necessary so that it may respond to the complaint and have a reasonable opportunity to correct the violation.
It is not the breach itself, but rather the refusal to restore legality
which triggers the right to intervene. 45 Another state might
well have an interest sufficiently direct to give it a right of co-intervention.
The ultimate goal of enforcing universal humanitarian norms
justifies general publication among the community of nations.
Even if only one state actually carries out the intervention, its action must be on behalf of the "humanitas," without self-interest or
expectation of national political, economic or military gain. Publication means thorough scrutiny by the community of nations, a
strong incentive to scrupulously disinterested action.
43. Direct or indirect forms of Genocide (e.g. cases of individual violations) might eventually also lead to intervention. It should, however, take
another form and not consist of a physical or field intervention.
44. Rougier, supra note 16, at 512.
45. Stowell, supra note 16, at 111.
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3. Reasonable opportunity to restore human rights. Since
it is the refusal of redress which gives the right to intervene, the
state must be allowed a reasonable time to restore legality. Specific time limits will, of course, depend upon the particular circumstances of each case, such as the magnitude of the breach, the
reversibility of its effects and the difficulty of correction. To
posit a rough general rule: the greater the damages caused by the
illegal practice, the more rapidly the illegality must be terminated.
4. Exhaustion of all peaceful means. No force may be exercised for humanitarian purposes without positive proof that all
available and reasonably effective means of restoring human rights
have been exhausted without fair indication of impending successful results. Diplomatic channels as well as international and regional organizations should be utilized, or at least explored for
possible use in light of the factual situation. Only when it is
certain that no method short of force will produce the necessary
result can force be employed. Military action in any less drastic
circumstances is unacceptable.4 6
5. Notification of imminent armed intervention. This precautionary mechanism would insure that force would never be
brought to bear until no other alternative was available.
While it is imperative that these five steps be completed, the
urgency of a situation may be so great that immediate action is
required. The procedure is such that its performance consumes
time in inverse proportion to the need for humanitarian assistance.
A major human crisis is readily discernible so that the documentation of facts concerning it for purposes of complaint preparation
can be accomplished rapidly. The greater the suffering, the less
information will probably be necessary to make a valid case for
intervention. Similarly, a reasonable opportunity to correct ,a very
grave situation is a shorter period of time than that which would
be reasonable for the correction of a less serious condition. Peaceful means of alleviating suffering on a large scale are rapidly exhausted because they are rapidly attempted where the need is
great, and only immediate results can be considered successful.
The procedural pace will be controlled by, and responsive to, the
circumstances of each case.
46. In the Stanleyville case, Foreign Minister Spaak carefully indicated
that all steps for a peaceful settlement had failed at the time of the intervention,
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1173 at 6 (1964).
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The Intervening Authority

A humanitarian intervention can only be rationalized if it is
undertaken by an authority acting within the scope of its competence. Since the goals of a humanitarian action are to further
the general interest of mankind and to preserve universal morality,
individual interventions should be avoided to prevent perversion
of these purposes. Stowell would limit the acting states to those
not having a direct interest in the case. 47 This might avoid suspicion, as well as reducing the incentive to overreaction and abuse
of power. Procedural devices, such as those outlined above, would
be of great value in minimizing these risks. A humanitarian operation is an international police action;4 8 at a time when the international community is organized into a series of organizations aiming at peace, security and justice, the duty to enforce respect for
human dignity logically rests on them as possessors of the potential political, legal and even military power to act.
An intervention by a multinational organization guarantees
the strength of international support free from the pursuit of national interests or political goals. Further, optimal protection of
human rights can only be obtained through a collective channel.
Any humanitarian action performed or endorsed by an international organization, even if imperfect and subject to political criticism, annuls the major arguments against intervention. It may
be said, then, that such an intervention is permissible under international law if: (1) initiated for the protection of highest human
values by ending a grave breach of humanitarian law; (2) executed in strict compliance with a formal procedure designed to
guarantee the rights of accused nations; and (3) performed by a
neutral international organization, or by a state under the direction and control of such an organization.
IV.

THE ROLE OF

THE UNITED NATIONS IN

HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTIONS

The necessity of an absolute distinction between political and
humanitarian motives is clear. International social solidarity, manifested in internationally decided actions and sanctions to compel
compliance with humanitarian law, is the surest guarantor of human rights. An individual action, even by a powerful sovereign,
47. Rougier, supra note 1.6, at 502; Stowell, supra note 16, at 144.
48. Rougier, supra note 16, at 499.
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cannot have the precise impact of marshalled international solidarity because
in the absence of an international organization, solidly built
upon one clear law, it is to be feared that the spirit of domination which finds itself in this noble institution, that of the
desire to protect all human beings, would be a facile pretext
49
for well camoflaged victories.
It is up to the international community, and to the United Nations
as its agent, to be the public prosecutor of violations of humanitarian law and the principles embodied in the Charter.
The function of the United Nations itself is not primarily relief action, although the aid provided through UNDP, UNICEF,
the High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Program is substantial. Whenever the Red Cross has been called
upon, prompt action has followed, either by the ICRC, the national committees or the Red Cross League. F.A.O., W.H.O. and
other specialized agencies can and will render assistance without
danger of interference in the domestic affairs of the receiving state.
Such aid would continue to be provided principally by these international, non-governmental national and specialized U.N. agencies
which have proven their dedication and efficiency.
Humanitarian assistance must be offered in time of war and
of peace, in international as well as internal crises. The United
Nations for its part must insure that direct aid to human beings
cannot be thwarted by irresponsible sovereigns. The Nigerian
civil war demonstrates the impotence of relief organizations in the
face of politically or militarily motivated refusals of assistance.
Any challenge to such recalcitrance would defeat the purpose of
these organizations, since absolute neutrality and the refusal to employ force are essential to the accomplishment of their tasks. The
political and military power to compel sovereign acceptance of
aid lies in the hands of the United Nations. When a situation demands the protection of a relief effort the U.N. must have the
capability and the courage to back the Red Cross or any other
humanitarian organization in the field with forceful intervention.
Those directly involved with the performance of relief missions are well aware of the need for a "humanitarian policeman:"
One will say: there is the International Red Cross and the
W.H.O. Yes, but they are often paralyzed through the failure
of the combatants to open the trail in a region trodden by
49. Aroneanu, supra note 15, at 187.
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guerillas and insurgents.

Amid the combat and disorder the

doctors and nurses are precious; but they are even more so
if accompanied by the police.

The W.H.O. was not created

for interventions of war or insurrection; the most efficacious
organization can be none other than the Health Service of
the armed forces of the U.N. 50

Collective action in view of providing vital aid is assured of broad
support among all who respect basic human rights because
[i]t in no way affects the legality of intervention; it reenforces on the other hand the impression that this action really
constitutes an intervention and does not serve to conceal an

unwarranted incursion. 5 1
Authority for humanitarian initiative by the United Nations
itself may be found in the U.N. Charter 52 and the Red Cross Conventions. 53 The 1949 Geneva Conventions not only provide for
the control of such interventions through the Protecting Power
scheme, 54 but also permit entrustment of the duties incumbent on
the Protecting Power to an international organization upon the
agreement of the parties in armed conflict.5 5 This device has
been reexamined recently in the Geneva Expert Conference of
May, 1972.56 Many experts, advocating a certain automatism in
the appointment of a supervisory body which would eliminate the
need for the express consent of the parties to the conflict, proposed to assign the task to a permanent organ to be created within
the U.N. 57 A new specialized organ, a U.N. High Commissioner
for HumanitarianLaw or a U.N. Disaster Relief Controller could
50. Nomerot-Dumaine, II faut que les forces armies de I'onu possedent
un etat-major midical permanent, 16 LA PRESSE MF.DICALE 944 (1965).
51. Stowell, supra note 16, at 137.
52. U.N. CHARTER chs. VII, IX.

53. Conventions cited note 40 supra.
54. (1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, art. 8
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, art. 8, [1955]
3 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, art. 8 [1955]
3 U.S.T. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; (4) Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949, art. 9, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
55. Id., citing each convention by its parenthetical number: (1) art. 10,
(2) art. 10, (3) art. 10, (4) art. 11.
56. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 41.
57. Id., Report of Commission IV, at pts. 4.54, 4.57, 4.63.
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indeed be established whereby the total mechanism of the Charter
would remain available for application in the event an interven58
tion becomes necessary.
The Geneva Conventions permit military protection of medical units and their activities.5" This protective role need not be
assumed by the relief unit itself, but could be undertaken by a
United Nations Relief Protection Force. A humanitarian mission
could thus be conducted with the support of an accompanying
armed force when required to make the mission possible. 6° The
U.N. Charter permits such activity."' Preservation of peace and
security, as well as the protection of fundamental human rights,
are among the principle goals of the Organization. To these ends
measures may be taken either by the Security Council within the
limits of chapter VII, 62 or by the General Assembly as, for example, when invoking the Uniting for Peace Resolution clause. 68
Further, protection of a humanitarian organization unable to accomplish its mission for security reasons is already one of the essential duties of the U.N.64
The modalities of humanitarian intervention raise no major
legal difficulties. In conformity with the procedure outlined above
a Commission of Inquiry could be created to assure objective factfinding. The Division of Human Rights would be responsible for
its composition, while a High Commissioner for HumanitarianLaw
would preside over it. Members could be appointed according
to the system used in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, each
member nation submitting a list of eligible persons to the Secretary General's Office. In this way the preferences of each of the
parties to a conflict could be taken into account, hopefully leading
58. De Beco, Les Missions humanitaires et le secours d'urgence en temps

de guerre, 13 ANN. D. INT'L MEDIC. 42, 46 (1966).
59. E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, art. 22
[1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; and see LES
TIONS DE GENEVE DU

12

AOIOT

CONVEN-

1949, 223 et seq. (J.S. Pictet ed., le Convention

1952).
60. R. de Geouffre de la Pradelle, La Croix Rouge et la lecon de Stanleyville, LE MONDE, Dec. 25, 1964, at 5.
61. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 57, in conjunction with ch. VII.

62. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
63. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); Woolsey,
Editorial Comment, The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the United Nations,
45 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1951).

64. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 313, 320; Missions humanitaires et Nations Unies, 12 ANN. D. INT'L MED. 71, 73 (1965).
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to greater confidence in the system. In addition to conducting
inquiries, the Commission could eventually exercise a control function over the application of humanitarian rules.
In cases of more or less straightforward military intervention
(for example, air protection of relief flights or troop protection
of civilian evacuations) U.N. peacekeeping units or police forces,
which have performed successfully in several difficult circumstances, could be utilized in various capacities as suggested by past
experience. In cases where more complex humanitarian considerations are involved, the nature of the intervention would justify
the creation of a separate police body: United Nations Relief Protection Force. The composition of such a force would present little
difficulty; several states have already expressed willingness to keep
armed forces and logistic -units at the disposal of the U.N. on a
permanent basis. 65 The choice of component nationalities can
therefore be made in such a way that partisan interference is
avoided, thereby neutralizing arguments of humanitarian neocolonialism. The various national contingents can be made up of
regular draftees, remaining in their home countries and constituting an ad hoc stand by force. The whole mechanism would
be set in motion by the Security Council or the General Assembly
according to the existing rules.
The only technical obstacle might be the creation of a permanent mixed medical-military staff committee responsible for
the operative functioning of these units. While all attempts to
actualize articles 46 and 47 of the Charter have failed,66 the idea
of a HumanitarianStaff Committee might well be realized. The
substance is different and humanitarian issues generally elicit a
more positive response than military questions, so the chances of
Security Council unanimity are greater. This special staff could
be placed within the office of the Secretariat since article 97 imposes no limit on the size of the Secretariat staff. 67 Several proposals have been tendered for the creation of such an organ.68
The political chances of inducing a positive United Nations
commitment to protective intervention will depend on the nerve
65. E.g., the Scandinavian countries; see also

BOWETr,

UNITED NATIONS

313-330 (1964); Guerisse, Jacquemin, Kellens, Les Forces Armdes de
I'ONU face leur mission sanitaireet humanitaire,11 ANN. D. INT'L MIic. 16, 33
FORCES

(1964).
66. U.N. CHARTER arts. 46, 47.

67. Id. art. 97.
68. De Beco, supra note 58, at 50 et seq.; see also

Proposals

by the Inter-

national Commission of Jurists in 21 BULL. DE LA COMM'N INT'L JUR. (1964).
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and perserverence of a few influential nations within the U.N.; not
the big powers, but those governments whose internationally
minded policies and non-alignment in conflict situations have
gained them the ear of East and West. Recurring humanitarian
crises have made evident the necessity of a Humanitarian Assistance Treaty clearly stating the rights and duties of states and international organizations relative to humanitarian relief and protective intervention. As an absolute minimum solution for the present, and hopefully only the initial step, the General Assembly
should make a formal declaration in this respect.
V.

CONCLUSION

On several occasions former Secretary-General U Thant has
expressed concern over the chilling disregard for humanitarian
principles which the world has witnessed in recent years. During
the Biafran crisis he distinguished the human issues from the
political and military questions:
I would like to stress once again, in the name of the most
fundamental humanitarian principles, that the urgent need is
not only for larger shipments of relief supplies but also the enlisting of the full and wholehearted cooperation of those in
positions of responsibility and authority in regard to the facilities for the movement and distribution of supplies. 6 9
It is not clear whether U Thant was referring exclusively to
the responsibilities and authority of the U.N. in these matters.
Nevertheless, it seems that the only chance for wider acceptance
of the concept of humanitarian intervention in international law
lies within the grasp of the United Nations. The line between
such interventions and those tainted with political, economic or
military motives will always be difficult to draw unless the action
is initiated by a neutral universal organization.
Humanitarian intervention involves a number of legal, political and technical problems. No organization other than the U.N.
is in a better position to detect breaches or evaluate facts in light
of the existing legal rules, to observe and inquire, to take diplomatic, political or military action. In cases of direct intervention,
as well as in cases of protection of relief organizations, the member
nations of the U.N. have a profound responsibility to mankind
and the duty to realize the letter and the spirit of the Charter.
69. Speech by Secretary-General U Thant regarding the role of the
United Nations, Sept. 12, 1969, 6 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 54, 56 (No. 9,

1969).
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